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This thesis addresses Nimitz class aircraft carrier tank and void
maintenance. It contributes to the solution of current maintenance problems
in four ways. First, it stratifies Nimitz class aircraft carrier tanks and voids
into ten groups and assigns a criticality factor to each group. These groups
and criticality factors can be extended to other classes of ships. Second, it
demonstrates methods to estimate the survival function of tank and void
coating lifetimes based on inspection data. Actual estimates of the survival
function for each group are given, but are based on current data of
questionable quality. Third, it develops a decision tool to plan inspections
and budget maintenance costs over multiyear periods. Preliminary
application of this tool demonstrates the cost effectiveness of driving
maintenance by inspection. Finally, sampling plans provided to AIRLANT
for CVN 71 1997 EDSRA and CVN 73 1997 SRA are discussed. These
sampling plans were developed to obtain unbiased estimates of the current
proportion of failed tanks within each group. By using plans such as these,
unbiased estimates of the survival function for each group can be computed.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis addresses the complex and costly issue ofNimitz class (CVN 68 and
beyond) aircraft carrier tank and void maintenance. It contributes to solution of current
maintenance problems in four ways.
First, it stratifies Nimitz class aircraft carrier tanks and voids into ten groups along
with the assignment of a criticality factor to each group. The groups are validated by both
expert opinion and data analysis (Chapter V). These groups and criticality factors can be
extended to other classes of ships and have already been used for conventional powered
aircraft carriers CV 63 and CV 64.
Second, it demonstrates methods to estimate the survival function oftank and void
coating lifetimes based on the records found in the Tank and Void Database (T&VDB).
Actual estimates of the survival function for each group are given, but are based on
current data of questionable quality. Reliable estimates of the survival function can not be
obtained until credible inspection and maintenance data are routinely entered into the
T&VDB.
Third, it develops a decision tool to plan inspections ofa tank or void in the 72 to
96 month period between overhauls. Preliminary application of this tool demonstrates the
cost effectiveness of driving maintenance by inspection oftanks and voids between
overhaul periods. It also provides a tool for quantifying long term costs of various
maintenance options. With this tool, the maintenance managers can plan and budget tank
and void maintenance costs over multiyear periods.
Finally, sampling plans provided to AIRLANT for CVN 71 1997 EDSRA and
CVN 73 1 997 SRA are discussed. These sampling plans were developed to obtain
unbiased estimates of the current proportion of failed tanks within each group. By using
plans such as these, unbiased estimates ofthe survival function for each group can be
computed.
IX




Update Preventive Maintenance System Maintenance Requirements Cards to
specifically require records of all tank and void inspections be entered into the
T&VDB.
2. Establish a ship's tank and void coordinator as a single point of contact for the
T&VDB.
3. Establish a formal path and periodicity for T&VDB updates and information
transfer.
4. Generate a routine report of current and historical tank and void conditions
specifically for use by maintenance managers to plan tank and void work.
This thesis provides a framework for developing a long term inspection and maintenance
program. It is expected that the approaches outlined in this thesis will evolve as more is
learned about the deterioration process oftank and void coatings and as new technologies
for maintaining and inspecting the coatings become available.
I. INTRODUCTION
Aircraft carriers are vital national assets from which our nation projects it's will,
might, and foreign policy. They are often called to action in the far corners of the earth.
Their presence shows U.S. resolve in foreign policy matters and provides the military
punch necessary to implement those policies. Figure 1-1 shows USS GEORGE
WASHINGTON (CVN 73) performing replenishment of JP-5 fuel, for its' airwing, while
underway in support of operation "Joint Endeavor."
,-~fe-
Figure 1-1 USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN 73) and USSARTHUR W. RADFORD
(DD 968) performing simultaneous underway replenishment ofJP-5fuelfrom USS
MERRIMACK (AO 179) in support ofoperation "Joint Endeavor. "

The economic realities of our nations budget have effected these ships. We are asking the
current generation of aircraft carriers, the USS NIMITZ class (CVN 68 and beyond), to
last fifty years, twenty years longer than was planned for their predecessors. To sustain
these ships, we must ensure that they receive good and timely maintenance and that the
funds allocated for that maintenance be expended in the wisest possible manner. Proper
maintenance ofthe tanks and voids onboard these ships is a key element in ensuring their
readiness through the midpoint of the next century. This thesis will address how to best
schedule the inspections oftanks and voids used to drive this maintenance.
A. BACKGROUND
Aircraft carriers have been characterized as floating airports and even small cities.
Beneath the action of the flight deck and the maintenance hanger lies a different
characterization. Outboard ofthe machinery, living, and work spaces on the fourth and
lower decks, and below the eighth deck lies the tank and void system. These tanks carry
the fuel and other fluid resources that make the flight of aircraft possible, and that maintain
the list and trim of the ship to make those operations viable. Proper maintenance of this
hidden system is imperative to ensure the purity of fluid cargo, the ability ofthe ship to
meet list and trim requirements, and the structural integrity ofthe ship.
Tank and void maintenance is currently one ofthe top ten Housekeeping and
Maintenance Engineering (HM&E) costs ofmaintaining the US carrier fleet (Scalet 1996),
with costs estimated at 24.7 million dollars per ship, per maintenance cycle (about 60
months) or approximately 12.8 percent of total HM&E expenditures in 1994 (Scalet
1995). Since tank repairs must be performed in dry-dock the performance ofthese repairs
can become the critical path maintenance item for exiting dry-dock as was the case for the
CVN 69 1995 Complex Overhaul. The danger and physical difficulty involved with tank
maintenance and inspection require sound planning to minimize inspections while finding

all necessary repairs in time to plan and execute them at lowest cost and with the smallest
operational impact to the ship.
In her thesis LT Cynthia Womble (Womble 1994) documented the need for an
inspection plan and record system to better track and predict the failure behavior ofNimitz
class aircraft carrier (CVN 68 class) tank and void coatings. This inspection plan and
record system must be capable ofproviding the ship's maintenance manager with the
necessary information to make well-informed decisions about which tanks and voids to
inspect and repair at each availability. Engineers at Planning and Engineering for Repairs
and Alterations for Aircraft Carriers (PERA(CV)) have developed an inspection record
data-base along with an inspection form to be filled out by personnel inspecting tanks and
voids (CLER 1995). This data-base is currently being installed on all CVN 68 class and
several earlier class aircraft carriers.
B. THE PROBLEM
Maintenance managers have adopted several conservative schemes, based on their
individual experience and priorities, with which to overhaul tanks. While the specifics
vary slightly from ship to ship, the basis of each scheme is to overhaul as many tanks at
each dry-docking as possible. Planning which tanks to overhaul is no small task. The
majority of the tanks under consideration can only be overhauled while the ship is in dry-
dock which occurs approximately every 72 to 96 months of ship life. Overhauls planned
well in advance of dry-docking availability are expensive, but significantly less expensive
than those found after the initial planning period. In order to know which tanks to
schedule for overhaul, it is necessary to inspect them prior to the initial planning period for
the dry dock overhaul. Inspections are performed by ships force and by Intermediate
Maintenance Activity (IMA) inspectors in port at approximately 24 month intervals. Only
partial inspection ofthe ship's tanks and voids can be completed each 24 month inspection
opportunity. The operational requirements of maintaining minimum fluid volumes,
hazards of shifting fluid cargo (especially JP-5) in port, and limited available man-hours
(cleaning and inspecting takes about seven days per tank) and funds preclude 100% tank
and void inspection during any period short of a Complex Overhaul (COH). To further
complicate matters records of past inspections and maintenance are sparse, and of variable
quality.
An inspection plan should take into consideration all ofthese factors and be
designed to minimize total tank and void maintenance costs while maintaining safety and
readiness standards. Specifically the plan needs to:
1
.
Minimize the total number of tanks and voids inspected at any single inspection
opportunity.
2. Minimize the total number oftanks with undetected coating failures.
3. Be adaptable to individual ship needs and condition changes.
4. Incorporate the difference in tank function and the effects oftank failure into
the decision process.
Development of a comprehensive inspection plan that is feasible and meets these
objectives will take the combined effort of the maintenance planners, civilian maintenance
workers, Carrier Engineering Maintenance Assistance Team (CEMAT), Planning and
Engineering for Repairs and Alterations Aircraft Carriers (PERA(CV)) maintenance
assistance personnel, ship's force personnel and supervisors, and AIRLANT / AIRPAC
leadership.
This thesis contributes to the development ofan inspection plan. In Chapter II
current maintenance planning and data collection procedures are discussed. Chapter III
provides a brief background ofthe principles of corrosion and direct chemical attack, the
mechanism by which tank coating is destroyed. In Chapter IV, tanks and voids are
stratified into groups based on engineering considerations and assigned a criticality factor.
Survival functions oftank and void coating lifetimes are estimated based on available data
for each group in Chapter V. These survival functions are used to check the groupings of
Chapter IV. Chapter VI discusses development of a life-cycle decision model for
inspection planning. In Chapter VII the sampling plans to provide those estimates for
CVN 71's 1997 EDSRA and CVN 73's 1997 SRA are discussed. Chapter VIII provides
conclusions and recommendations.

II. TANK AND VOID MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION PLANNING
PROBLEMS
In FY 1994 Commander Naval Air Forces Atlantic (AIRLANT) spent 9.7 million
dollars on Intermediate Maintenance Availability (IMA) level tank and void maintenance
and repair for five aircraft carriers. A significant portion of this expense was in the areas
of growth (expansion ofa current work package to incorporate related maintenance found
to be required after the work package was issued) and new-work (issuance of a new work
package typically after close of the maintenance planning window for pre-planned work)
(Scalet, 1995). This unplanned maintenance expense directly effects the maintenance
dollars available for other projects. Unglamorous as they may be, tanks and voids were
the critical path dry-dock maintenance project on the CVN 69 in her last (FY 1994) depot
availability, predominantly due to growth and new-work. Of all Atlantic Fleet carrier
tanks and voids which work was performed in FY 1994, 52% ofthe Tanks and Voids
worked were opened due to Tank Level Indicator (TLI) failure (Scalet, 1995). The
unsatisfactory coating conditions found during these TLI repairs precipitated a substantial
portion of the new-work for tanks and voids in FY 1 994. Clearly we are not doing an
adequate job oftracking the status of a system, when more than 50% of the maintenance
needs for that system arise out of surprise findings.
A. SHIP BOARD INSPECTION PROCEDURES
Ship's Force Determ
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Figure II-l Shipboard tank and void inspection process.
Tank inspections, dictated by Preventative Maintenance System (PMS)
requirements, are controlled by several different work centers aboard the ship. Inspection
of fuel tanks by the Fuels Division often requires access through voids that are inspected
by the Damage Control division. Simultaneous inspection of both the fuel tank and the
access void is rare. Thus work required to inspect the access void separately results in
duplication of effort. Once tanks are inspected, the Maintenance Petty Officer (PO)
provides his Work Center Supervisor (WCS) with an inspection sheet. If unsatisfactory
conditions are found in the inspection, a PMS form 2190-2K (2K) is created and work is
added to the ships next availability (planned work created) via the Consolidated Ship's
Maintenance Plan (CSMP). Otherwise, no 2K is submitted for the inspection. There is no
systematic institutionalized procedure for keeping records (other than those generating
2K's). How they are kept differs by the division and work center supervisor. For
example, the CVN 69 Fuels Division maintains only the most current record in paper form
and historical records are discarded. The CVN 69 Damage Control division maintains
records electronically. In addition, to the records kept by each division, each carrier has a
Tank and Void data base (T&VDB), designed by PERA(CV) engineers, whose purpose is
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to keep records from all tank and void inspections in electronic form. The T&VDB is
kept on a dedicated PC in one location aboard ship and requires additional effort to enter
inspection data. -*
Periodically, (such as at the end of every availability) the ship's T&VDB is
downloaded to PERA(CV)'s T&VDB which contains tank and void maintenance and
inspection records for all carriers including records for work done in the shipyards. In the
past, results of inspections were not usually recorded in the T&VDB. PERA(CV) is
trying to reconcile this. Figure II- 1 documents the ship's tank and void inspection
process.
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Figure 11-2 Current maintenance planning process.
Currently, no information (other than repair 2K's) is systematically cycled back to
the maintenance managers to plan future work. This is shown in Figure II-2. In
particular, record is often not kept or made available to the maintenance planning manager
about the tanks that have been inspected but require no further work by either the ships
force or IMA inspectors. This leads to frequent inspection of some tanks and voids and
infrequent or no inspection of others. Thus, it is difficult for a maintenance planning
manager to get an unbiased overall picture of the current conditions oftanks and voids.
Information about tanks and voids that have exhibited some deterioration but not enough
to generate a 2K work request is also lost. This information, if recorded and analyzed,
could provide valuable insight into the process of coating failure. Coating deterioration
rates have never been quantified for tanks and voids in an operational setting.
Additionally, tanks and voids that exhibit some deterioration are prime candidates for
future planned work. Knowledge of their deteriorating condition could provide savings in
inspections and repair expense.
Maintenance planning managers do not have the information and tools they need
to plan tank and void overhauls. This results in work being performed as more costly new
or growth work rather than pre-planned work. In addition, when new or growth work is
discovered ships are often forced to perform sensitive and hazardous operations such as
transferring fuel. Pre-planning gives the ship an opportunity to prepare for tank and void
maintenance prior to entering port. Better record keeping can provide the information
necessary to develop better and more precise analytic tools with which the amount of
unplanned maintenance is reduced.
C. TANK & VOID DATA BASE
PERA(CV) in cooperation with American Systems Engineering Corporation
(AMSEC / SAIC) and Applied Technical Systems (ATS) has developed a Tank & Void
database (T&VDB). The purpose of this database is to provide the ship and maintenance
managers with a method ofcommunicating information about tank maintenance and
inspections. This program is under rapid development and has gone from a single PC
DOS program to a WINDOWS version suitable for installation on the ship's Local Area
Network (LAN). This program provides easy data input and ready reference of tank
conditions from previously entered data. In conjunction with the database, the Tank and
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Void Inspection Manual, has been developed as a guide for performing inspections and
recording their results. This provides consistent inspection records from both the ship's
force (SF) and IMA inspectors. The inspection manual classifies the coating condition of
a tanks surface as a condition value of 1, 2, 3, or 4. An example of these is shown in
Figure II-3. Conditions 3 or 4 require work be performed.
Figure II-3 Tank coating conditions (CLER, 1995).
This program has met some resistance in the fleet primarily because it requires the
additional, short term, work of entering the inspection data into the computer. Updated
PMS Maintenance Requirements Cards (MRC's) requiring this step be performed have yet
to be issued. The gain from using the T&VDB lies in the ability to track long term
processes, such as the deterioration of tank coatings, and so that maintenance planners and




The tanks and voids of concern in this thesis are all fabricated by abutment of
bulkheads to the structural framing of the ship. They are constructed of the same mild and
structural steel as the rest of the structural members of the ship. As such, the surfaces of
these tanks must be coated to protect their structural integrity.
Figure III-l A Shipyard worker preparing a section of tankfor initial paint coatingprior
to its beingfitted into place during new construction.
A tank or void "fails" when the coating is sufficiently corroded. Thus, tank failure
or lifetime actually refers to coating failure or lifetime By keeping track of the surface
13

coating condition and overhauling that surface before significant opportunity for corrosion
of the structural components has occurred the mechanical integrity ofthese components
can be maintained throughout the ship's lifetime.
.
*
A. CORROSION AND DIRECT CHEMICAL ATTACK
The primary purpose oftank coatings is to protect the structural elements (made
mostly of mild steel) from corrosion due to direct chemical attack by the environment to
which they are exposed. It then follows that the protective coating applied to these
structural members will also be subjected to direct chemical attack from the same
environment. Trade-off occurs when the coating materials are more inert than the material
they are protecting and are easily renewable compared to replacement ofthe base material.
The model for this type of chemical attack was developed by Przemieniecki
(Przemieniecki 1988). This model represents the rate of corrosion penetration of a
specific material subjected to a direct chemical attack in a specified environment. The






juc - rate of corrosion penetration in mils/year,
wL = weight loss ofthe exposed material in mg,
d = density ofthe exposed material in gm/cm
,
T = exposure time in hours,
as = exposed surface area in inches
2
.
This model explains why different functional characterizations exist for tanks containing
the same type of fluid (their exposure time and exposed surface area are dissimilar), and
why tanks containing different types of fluid (the chemical attack oftwo different solvents
causes oxidation ofthe protective layer to occur at different rates) are characterized
separately. The type, location, and nature ofthe chemical attack and the properties of the
14

material under attack are the key factors in the deterioration of the coating material. The




IV. TANK AND VOID CHARACTERIZATION
The approximately 1000 tanks and voids on a NIM3TZ class carrier have a wide
variety of functions and failure modes. When considered in fine detail, each tank or void
possesses attributes that make it unique. The eighth deck overhead views of tanks ofCV
64 in Figures IV-2 and IV-3 demonstrate the arrangement of the tanks pictured in Figure
IV- 1 . From these figures and a cross section view given in Figure IV-4, the vast










Figure IV-2Forward overhead layout of8
th deck tanks ofCV 64.
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Figure IV-3 Aft overhead layout of8
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Careful aggregation of similar tanks and voids into a small number of groups of
like tanks and voids can greatly simplify the planning and execution of their maintenance.
In this chapter 855 ofthese tanks and voids are divided into ten distinct groups.
Information used to develop these groups is oftwo types:
1
.
Documentation of ship configuration and tank and void designation / utilization
from:
a. Current T&VDB record entries.
b. AutoCAD tank-top drawings ofCVN's 68 through 73 fourth and eighth
decks in the T&VDB.
c. Ship's configuration plate drawings on file at PERA(CV) for CVN's 68
through 73.
2. Personal interviews with Engineers, Project Managers, Officers,
Chiefs, and Petty Officers ofthe ships CVN 68, CVN 69,
CVN 70, CVN 71, and CVN 72.
A. TANK CHARACTERIZATION
The chemical attack model described in the previous Chapter helps define the two




The functional characterization of the tank or void.
a. Type of liquid held.
b. Type of function performed by the tank.
c. Location of the tank.
d. Coating material properties (type and composition of paint applied).
2. Major types oftank and void failure.
a. Corrosion (coating, cathodic protection, structural, piping, and ladder failure).
b. Contamination of contained liquid.
21
c. Instrumentation (tank level indicator or sounding tube failure).
When characterized according to these factors, sixteen groups of tanks are defined. Four
of these groups, (Contaminated Holding Tanks (CHT), Fresh Water (FW), Chain, and
Propulsion plant tanks), are not considered because they are currently maintained
according to more restrictive PMS requirements. The remaining groups are aggregated




JP-SERV Tanks which hold purified JP-5 fuel for immediate fueling of aircraft.
2. J (TRANS) Tanks which are directly involved in the purification of fuel both into and
(in the case of de-fueling) out of aircraft.
3. J (FULL) Bulk stowage tanks for JP-5 fuel.
4. LUBE-OIL Bulk stowage of ship's lube oil reserves and lube oil purification process
tanks.
5. SEA WTR (FREQ) Tanks routinely exposed to sea water by design such as list
control tanks.
6. SEA WTR (INF) Tanks that are floodable but are not by design routinely exposed to
sea water such as damage control tanks.
7. CAT WING VOIDS The tanks that function to provide drainage for the flight deck
catapult track.
8. CAT EXHAUST Tanks that receive the effluent from the catapult water brakes.
9. DRY Tanks and voids that are not flooded by design.
10. SPONSON Dry tanks that are created by fairing of ships hull shape.
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Figure TV-5 CVN 73 tank groupings.
B. CRITICALITY OF TANKS
The severity of impact on ships mission by failure of one type of tank may differ
significantly from like failure of another type of tank. To provide a means for weighing
the severity ofan individual failure the following evaluation priorities are established:
Ship's Mobility. Failure of a tank that effects ships mobility impacts the ships
ability to travel to its assigned operating waters and its ability to conduct flight operations
when in those waters.
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Ship's Mission to support Air operations. Failure of a tank that effects the
ships ability to conduct full flight operations directly degrades the ship's primary mission
capabilities. >
Ship's Structural Integrity. The honeycomb of tanks that comprise the bulk of
the ship's volume below the eighth deck is created by segregation of areas between
structural frames by the addition of bulkheads. While strengthening the hull, these
bulkheads prevent casual observation of the condition of the ships structural members in
their most critical region. Unchecked corrosion in these areas can lead directly to
weakening of the ships structural integrity.
C. CRITICALITY FACTORS
Ranking the impact of a tank failure in each characterization group results in five
levels of criticality. These levels are ranked values (ordinal not continuous). While it is
apparent that a criticality factor four failure has a more significant impact on ships
operations than a criticality factor two failure, it is not true that the significance of a failure
of a tank in a group having criticality factor four will have exactly double the impact on
the ship as like failure of a tank from a group having a criticality factor of two.
Affects Ship Mobility (5) Propulsion critical tanks. Used for non-nuclear CV's,
the nuclear propulsion system tanks of the CVN's are under tighter (NAVSEA-08)
controls thus not included.
Affects Aircraft Operations (4) Failure of these tanks impacts ship's ability to
conduct full flight operations. Groupings include JP-Service tanks, which handle JP-5
directly before its use by airplanes, and Catapult Exhaust Voids that are critical for
catapult operations.
Affects Ship's Structure (3) Failure of any tank affects ship's structure. The
most vulnerable are assumed to have constant or regular exposure to sea water. Included
in this group are Overflow Box, and List Control tanks.
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Affects Cargo Use and Quality (2) Failure first occurs when the tank begins to
make its cargo unsuitable for its intended purpose. Tanks such as JP stowage tanks may
fail in this manner long before their level of deterioration begins to affect ship's structural
integrity. Fresh Water tanks fail similarly but their controls are administered under
industrial health requirements and thus (like nuclear propulsion tanks) are not included in
this inspection plan.
Non Critical Failure (1) Failure of a tank having no direct adverse affect on
ship's mission or operations. Tanks in this grouping include voids that are not capable of
intentional sea water ballasting and lube oil bulk storage tanks.
D. DISCUSSION
The characterization oftanks and voids into the ten groups of Figure IV-5 has
been briefed to representatives ofAIRPAC, AIRLANT, shipboard components ofCVN
69, CVN 70, and CVN 71 and twice at Tank and Void Improvement Program meetings.
This characterization is developed specifically for Nimitz class aircraft carriers
which use nuclear propulsion. However, with the inclusion oftwo more groups Fuel Oil
Storage, and Fuel Oil Service tanks, these groupings can be applied to other conventional
powered aircraft carriers. These groups are analogous to JP (FULL) and JP-SERV
respectively in support of the ship's propulsion plant. Fuel Oil Storage tanks are assigned
criticality level three and Fuel Oil Service tanks are assigned criticality level 5. In a
problem unrelated to this thesis, this characterization of tanks and voids was used to help
recommend tanks to inspect for the comparison ofCV 63 and CV 64. The purpose of the
comparison was to assess material condition to help determine which ship to homeport in




As documented by Womble (1994), the lack of tank and void Inspection data is
astounding. Since then, some carriers have taken proactive measures to make their tank
and void inspection data available. At this time the T&VDB is being installed on all CVN
68 class ships. Still, there exists a significant gulfbetween the amount and quality of data
available and that needed for inference and modeling. A degree of healthy skepticism
must be maintained when inferring results from the data used for this analysis. Much of
this data is suspect. It is not known what mechanism led to the choice oftanks that were
opened or overhauled. In addition, for much of the data, the tank condition is not
recorded, but inferred from maintenance performed on the tank. The real value of this
analysis is to establish a methodology for further analysis as more data becomes available.
A. THE DATA
Data analyzed herein comes from the historical files of the CVN 69, 71, & 72.
Two ofthese ships CVN 71 & 72 (commissioned in October 1986 and December 1989
respectively) are very young and have experienced few tank and void coating failures.
CVN 69 (commissioned in October 1 977) just completed her second dry-docking
availability (FY 1986 Complex Overhaul (COH), and FY 1995 COH) and has an extensive
history of repairs and inspections performed from each availability. Data from the CVN
69' s 1986 COH dry-docking is however constructed from repair records several years
after the fact. Appendix C, D, and E summarize the current inspection data for CVN 69,
71, and 72 respectively; Appendix F through N contain the details of each inspection
period's finding for each characterization group.
Because all of the CVN 69 records from it's first COFI only indicate whether a
tank or void was overhauled and not it's condition prior to overhaul, actual numbers of
tank and void failures are probably inflated. This conjecture is supported by the opinion of
several maintenance managers, and the fact that shipyards will perform contracted
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overhauls regardless of the tank condition found upon opening. This conjecture is also
supported by the data. In Figure V-l, it can be seen that the percentage ofJP-SERV
tanks that have failed by 106 months for CVN 69 is 30% where as none were found failed
by 1 10 months on CVN 71 . Thus, inference drawn from this data will be conservative in
the sense that tanks and voids will tend to have longer lifetimes than indicated by the data.
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Figure V-l Comparison ofobservedfailures ofJP-Service tank coating at different
coating agesfor CVN 69, 71, and 72.
The mechanism used to choose tanks for inspection can also lead to biased
estimates oftank failure rates. An example of this is observed in the high failure rate and
large proportion of tanks inspected in the SEA WTR (INF) group ofCVN 72, shown in
Figure V-2. The number inspected in this group is significantly higher than would
otherwise be expected from a simple survey. Anecdotal information reveals that several
ships of this class have experienced leakage in the sea water flooding valves for these
tanks. A correlation of this sort appears evident in the CVN 71110 month inspection in
which almost all SEA WTR (INF) tanks inspected were found to be failed. On the CVN
72, tanks of this group that had evidence of valve leakage were preferentially inspected
and many were found to be failed. Thus, the percentage of inspected tanks in this group is
higher than expected for a simple random sample and the proportion of failed tanks
observed is higher than can be expected in the SEA WTR (INF) group as a whole.
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Figure V-2 Comparison ofobservedfailures ofSEA WTR (INF) tank coating at different
coating agesfor CVN 69, 71, and 72.
Finally, because the quality of the data is suspect and much of the detailed
observations about the condition of coating failure is missing, tank and void conditions are
summarized as failed (maintenance is performed when the maximum coating condition of
various surfaces is 3 or 4) or as good ( the maximum coating condition is 1 or 2). This is
consistent with the definition of a failed tank used by maintenance managers (CLER
1995).
B. ESTIMATING TANK AND VOID SURVIVAL FUNCTIONS
Let X, with cumulative distribution function (cdf) F(t) = P(X <t), represent the
time until coating failure of a tank or void within a characterization group. The failure
distribution or equivalently the survival function S(t) = 1 - F(t) for tank and void coating
lifetimes has never been estimated in an operational environment. Maintenance and
inspection plans cannot be developed without estimates of the survival function for each of
the tank and void characterization groups.
The direct chemical attack failure mechanism is a wear-out process which
intuitively leads to the belief that a newer tank is less likely to fail than an older one.
Parametric families of distributions most often used to model such failure mechanisms are
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the one and two parameter Exponential, Weibull, Normal, LogNormal, and Gamma
distributions (Tobias and Trindale 1986). The Exponential distribution models lifetimes
with the memoryless property e.g., a tank that has not failed by 96 months is as likely to
survive say 24 more months as a new tank is. Since the Exponential distribution is a
special case ofboth the Weibull and Gamma distributions these two families also contain
distributions with the memoryless property. In addition, the Weibull, Gamma, Normal,
and LogNormal include distributions with increasing failure rate, i.e., distributions that
model the intuitive notion of wear. To get estimates of S(t), these parametric distributions
are fit to the data. The advantage of the parametric fit is that data in the early part ofthe
tanks life can be used to fit the entire survival function, including the right tail ofthe
survival function where no data has been observed.
1. Interval Censoring
The actual date of coating failure ofany one tank is unknown. Tank inspection
opportunities occur predominantly during in-port maintenance periods that occur
approximately every 24 months. Not all tanks and voids are inspected at every
opportunity. The best information about the date of coating failure is that it occurred
between inspections. This leads to three types of censored failure times.
a. Right censored failure. Tanks whose coating has not failed at the time ofthe
most recent inspection.
b. Left censored failure. Tanks which have had exactly one inspection with a
coating failure at that inspection (coating failure found on first post-overhaul
inspection).
c. Interval censored failure. Tanks where coating failure occurred after at least




Parametric fits for the survival function S(t) are based on interval censored data
and are performed by an iterative process known as the EM algorithm (Miller 1982).
Software that can properly estimate survival functions based on right, left, and interval
censored data are not readily available. Each iteration of the EM algorithm involves two
steps: the E-step or Expectation step and the M-step or Maximization step. The i - +1
iteration of the E-step computes the conditional expected values of the censored
observations (conditioned on the data) using the parametric values from the i - step. The
M-step then uses these expected values as ifthey were the true observed values and
performs maximum likelihood estimation based on complete data. Note that for the
Weibull and Gamma distributions there is no closed form solution for maximum likelihood
estimates thus the Newton Raphson method of finding the maxima for each step is used.
This gives the i - +1 iteration values for the point estimates ofthe parameters. The
process is repeated until the likelihood or parameters converge, depending upon the
application, (Tobias and Trindale 1 986).
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Figure V-3 Fitted parametric survivalfunctions oflifetimesfor JP-SERVICE tanks.
The Weibull distribution appears to most closely fit the data. Figure V-3 compares
the fitted survival functions for various parametric distributions with the nonparametric fit.
Note that in the regions of age where the inspections occur, predominantly 90-1 10 months
and 205-220 months, the Weibull and nonparametric fitted survival functions are close to
each other. For all groups the Weibull distribution is chosen to model the distribution of
time until failure. Figure V-4 shows the fitted Weibull survival functions for each group.
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Fitted Weibull Survival Functions by
Characterization Group
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Figure V-4 Fitted Weibull survivalfunctionsfor each tank characterization group.
Approximate confidence intervals (CI) for the parameters of the Weibull
distribution are found by bootstrapping (Rice 1995). First, for each group a random
sample (of size equal to the number of observations in that group) is generated from the
fitted Weibull. Each observation in the generated sample is subjected to censoring to
capture the increased uncertainty in the parametric estimates caused by interval censoring.
Because the censoring mechanism for the original data is unknown, the type of censoring
is determined by each observation in the original sample. For example, the first
observation in the JP-SERV group is right censored into the interval [61, oo). Thus, the
corresponding bootstrapped observation is taken to be censored into the interval [61, oo) if
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Figure V-5 JP-SERV Weibull Fit 90% Confidence Interval Bounds.
Figure V-5 illustrates the 90% confidence interval based on the Weibull fit to the
JP-SERV group. Note that the Weibull fit tends to be more conservative than the non-
parametric fit. It also gives estimates of the right tail of the distribution (time greater than
216 months) where no data has been collected.
3. Estimated Parameters
The analyses discussed in the previous section is repeated for each group of
tanks and voids. Table I shows the estimated Weibull parameters a and /? where the
Weibull survival function is given by:
o / \ -1—1 , for t > o
Note that there are no observed failures ofLUBE OIL tanks and no observations of any
kind for the CAT WING voids in the data set, hence no estimates of the survival function





Std Error Scale Std Error
JP-SERV 2.7101 0.027 206.6 0.982
J (TRANS) 1.9631 0.033 111.8 1.074
J (FULL) 1.7264 0.007 132.9 0.455
SWFREQ 1.5314 0.016 119.0 1.084
SWINF 1.0553 0.006 198.9 1.517
DRY 1.5382 0.007 307.9 1.268
SPONSON 1.7613 0.054 159.1 2.927
LUBE OIL - - - -
CAT EXH 0.6939 0.027 99.94 5.474
CAT WING - - - -
Table V-l Estimatedparametersfor the Weibull distributionfor each tank and void
characterization group.
Pointwise 95% confidence intervals for S(t) are computed from the confidence
ellipses for a and P and are shown in Appendices D through M. The confidence intervals
for a indicate a > 1 for all groups except CAT EXHAUST. For the Weibull distribution,
a > 1 corresponds to a distribution with increasing failure rate (a = 1 corresponds to a
constant failure rate and a < 1 corresponds to decreasing failure rate distributions).
Plausible explanations for the results ofCAT EXH are chance (the sample size is 8 data
points) or that the CAT EXH group consists of a mixture oftanks that have different
distributions (each with increasing failure rate). Such a mixture can produce an overall
decreasing failure rate (Barlow and Proschan 1 963).
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C. ANALYSIS OF TANK AND VOID GROUPINGS
Data from CVN's 69, 71, & 72 are used to check the choice of the ten
characterization groups. Figure V-6 shows the bootstrapped estimates of the a and P
parameters for all ten groups. Note that each group forms an elliptical region and that
many ofthe groups are clearly separated. This supports the original choice of tank and
void groups characterized by function and failure mode.
To see whether characterization groups can be further divided this analysis is
repeated for subgroups within characterization groups. Within each characterization
group, bootstrapped estimates ofa and P from subgroups are compared to each other and
the aggregate bootstrapped estimates for the entire group. All subgroups within each
major characterization show substantial overlap indicating that, at the current level of data
resolution, the characterization groups can not be divided further.
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Figure V-6 Bootstrapped estimatesfor Weibull parameters by characterization group.
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VI. A LIFE-CYCLE INSPECTION MODEL
The previous chapters discuss the methodology used for estimating the survival
function for each group of tanks and voids. This section uses those estimates to show
how a life-cycle inspection model can be developed. This model is intended to be used as
a decision aid for inspection planning. It considers the various options oftank and void
inspection for a 96 month period from dry-docking availability to dry-docking availability.
This model is not a comprehensive maintenance planning tool, but it does include the
options of overhauling without inspecting and neither inspecting nor overhauling of a tank
as inspection options.
A. THE SINGLE PERIOD INSPECTION DECISION
The influence diagram in Figure VI- 1 describes the inspection decision process for
a 96 month period between dry-docking opportunities where inspection opportunities are
available at 24 month intervals. The inspection decision model can be adapted to varying
lengths of time between overhaul periods and inspection opportunities. This includes, for
example, the addition or deletion of inspection opportunities as each ship's schedule
dictates. Inspection planning decisions are always subject to the four elements of influence
(decision options, forecast status, actual status, and results) shown in Figure VI- 1. The
function and interaction of each element in the influence diagram (Marshal and Oliver,
1 995) is explained below.
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Figure VI-1 Influence Diagramfor single 96 month period (between Overhaul
opportunities) Tank Inspection Decision.
1. Decision options
At each 24 month inspection opportunity only a portion of the ship's total tanks
and voids can be inspected. This decision model includes the options to inspect only at 24
months, 48 months, 72 months, or at 96 months. The option to inspect a tank more than
once is not available. This is realistic because tanks found to be failed at an inspection are
flagged for overhaul and not inspected again prior to that overhaul. For tanks that are
inspected and found to be in good condition, limited resources preclude reinspection
before the overhaul period. The option to overhaul a tank at the end ofthe period
(without inspecting it during the period), and the option to neither inspect nor overhaul a
tank are also included.
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2. Forecast Probability of Failure
At the end of each 96 month period the coating age of every tank is known. The
age of all tanks overhauled is reset to zero (overhauled as good as new), and the age of all
tanks not overhauled continues from their last date of overhaul. From the survival
functions (estimated in Chapter V) the probability of coating failure in the next 24 month
period between inspection opportunities is estimated based on the age of the tank. For
example, if a tank is overhauled at 96 months then its probability of failing in the 24 month
period following overhaul is the same as for a new tank. For a tank inspected but not
overhauled at 96 months, the probability that it will fail in the next 24 months is the
conditional probability that it will fail before 120 months given that it survived 96 months.
Thus the probability of failure for each tank is continually updated throughout its life.
3. Actual Status
The actual status of tank coating condition is a random event whose probability of
outcome is estimated by the forecast probability of failure, but whose certainty cannot be
known without an inspection. The action taken in the decision option does not influence
the actual condition ofthe tank during the maintenance period in question but may affect it
in the next period. For example, the decision to overhaul sets the actual condition at not
failed immediately following overhaul at the end of the period.
4. Results
The results in this model are the maintenance costs incurred from the actions taken
and actual status at the end of the 96 month inspection period. The results include the
costs of inspection, repairs, and a penalty cost, for missing an overhaul opportunity when
one is needed. Assessing a penalty cost precludes the naive decision option of never
making inspections and thereby incurring no costs. The decision to overhaul a tank once
it's condition has been found to be failed is a maintenance decision whose outcome
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depends upon factors not considered in this inspection model. For purposes of modeling it
is assumed that, once identified, all failed tanks are overhauled at the end of the 96 month
period. ^
B. MAINTENANCE MODEL COSTS
Maintenance costs are calculated from the average cost of inspection and repair of
a typical JP-5 stowage tank. In this model the cost of inspection is $5,000 and the cost of
pre-planned overhaul is $60,000. In reality, both the overhaul and inspection costs have
fixed and variable sub-portions. The fixed portion accounts for the planning and set-up
required to inspect or repair any tank within a given characterization group. The variable
portion is directly related to the surface area to be cleaned and / or overhauled. This
portion accounts for approximately 90% of the overhaul cost. The variable portion of the
costs is a function of the volume and surface area of a tank. These differ considerably
between tanks even within the same characterization group. But, the magnitude in cost of
inspection verses repair (1 : 12) is relatively constant for all tanks. Sensitivity analysis
performed in Section E of this chapter further investigates the effects of changing overhaul
and inspection costs on the inspection decision. The costs may be changed to meet more
specific values of individual tanks in question. However, the use of relative costs is
justified in the model because as long as the ratio of overhaul to inspection costs is 12:1,
the actual magnitude of the costs does not affect the results of the decision model. The
cost of performing a new work overhaul is modeled as twice the cost of performing a pre
planned overhaul. The cost of missing an overhaul opportunity is modeled as equal to the
tank's criticality factor times the overhaul cost.
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C. A DECISION AT ONE INSPECTION OPPORTUNITY
The elementary decision model makes use of a decision sapling (Marshal and
Oliver, 1995). A decision sapling incorporates the elements of the influence diagram into
a linear format which clearly defines their interactions and results. The 96 month
inspection decision model can be formulated as a decision tree made up of multiple
saplings. Each sapling represents the decision to inspect or not and the results for one
inspection opportunity. Understanding the interaction within the decision sapling provides
the basic building block from which more elaborate models (such as the 96 month model)
are constructed.
Figure VI-2 shows the decision sapling for the decision to inspect a tank at an
arbitrary time in life. The decision makers objective is to rninimize expected maintenance
costs (including the artificial penalty cost of missing a needed overhaul) by choosing the
inspection option with the smallest expected cost. In a model with more than two decision
options this objective results in an optimal and multiple sub-optimal options. The random
event of tank coating failure is the same regardless of the decision to inspect or not
inspect. But, as illustrated in the figure, the combination of this random event and the
decision taken provides four possible results.
The four possible results of this model are consistent with those of the larger
decision tree and are discussed here:




Cost of performing the inspection.
2. Specific tank condition becomes known and can be used to update and refine
the estimate ofthe survival function for the group.
3. The forecast failure probability for this tank may be updated based on the age
at inspection and the estimated survival function for the group.
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BI Tank was inspected and found to be in need of coating overhaul. This results
in the foliowing:
1. Cost of performing the inspection.
2. Specific tank condition becomes known and can be used to update and refine
the estimate ofthe survival function for the group.
3. Ifthe ship is not currently in a dry-docking availability the tank can be
scheduled for coating overhaul as pre-planned work at the next dry-docking
availability.
4. Ifthe ship is currently in a dry-docking availability the tank can be scheduled
for coating overhaul as new-work or growth in the current availability or as
pre-planned work in the next dry-docking availability. This decision will
depend upon the criticality of the tank, and available resources.
5. The tank will be flagged for overhaul and no further inspections should be
needed or performed until post overhaul close-out.




Specific tank condition remains unknown and additional information about the
survival function for the group not collected.
2. Expected age of failure for this tank not updated.
BN Tank was not inspected and is in need of coating overhaul. This results in the
following:
1 . Cost of performing the inspection not expended.
2. Specific tank condition remains unknown and additional information about the
survival function for the group not collected.
3. Ifthe ship is not in a dry-docking availability one (ofperhaps several)
opportunities for scheduling coating overhaul as pre-planned work at the next
dry-docking availability will be missed.
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4. If the ship is currently in a dry-docking availability the opportunity for coating










Figure VI-2 Decision Saplingfor evaluating the single opportunity decision to inspect or
not inspect.
Results from each random event are be rolled-back (Marshal and Oliver1995) to
compute an expected cost at that event node. Similarly the expected costs of each
decision option are rolled back to the decision node where the optimal decision is the
decision option which leads to the minimum expected cost. (The model software used is
DATA version 2.6.4 by TreAge Software Inc.).
D. THE 96 MONTH TANK INSPECTION DECISION MODEL
Incorporating the model for the 96 month period, the costs, and the model for a
single inspection opportunity into a working decision tool requires the full enumeration of
decision options and resulting costs. This gives a decision model with fourteen result
nodes. The model incorporates the full range of options. For example a tank inspected
and satisfactory at say month 24 can fail prior to the 96 month overhaul opportunity. If
this tank is not inspected again it results in a missed overhaul opportunity for that tank.
The 96 month inspection decision model for the JP-SERV group tanks as appears on the
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screen when using the DATA software is shown in Figure VI-3. This Figure shows the
process for deteraiining action on a typical JP-SERV tank based on the tanks inspection
and repair costs, its criticality, and the estimated survival probabilities of the tank -from
Chapter V.
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Figure VI-3 96 month Tank Inspection Decision Model. (Thisfigure is a screen capture
from DATA version 2.6.4 by TreAge Software Inc.)
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Figure \l-4 Roll-back of Tank Inspection Decision Model showing expected costs and
recommended action to take in JP-SERVICE tanks during the first 96 month period of
tank coating life.
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The Roll-back algorithm computes the expected cost at each chance node then
identifies the decision option that best meets the objective. Sub-optimal decision options
are indicated by double hash mark. The optimal first period decisiorroption is to inspect
at the 72 month opportunity (where if the tank needs overhaul it can be scheduled as pre-
planned work while making the chance of missing a needed overhaul small).
Expected costs change as the tank ages since the probability of failure increases
with tank life. Recalculation ofthe decision tree for each 96 month period between
overhauls gives the optimal and sub-optimal inspection options as the tank ages. Figure
VI-5 shows how this results in varying optimal decisions with tank life. In this figure the
expected costs are plotted for each of the six possible decision options as a function of the
96 month period. At the beginning of the i — 96 month period the age of the tank is set to
i * 96 { i = 1, 2, ... , 5 }. The expected costs are costs incurred only during a particular
96 month period. Here, overhaul without inspection is the most expensive option in the
first period due to the high probability of surviving that period. As the tank ages the cost
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Figure VI-5 Expected Costs of Tank Inspection Decisions as determinedfor each
Overhaul opportunity to Overhaul opportunity period oftank life (96 month overhaul
cycle with 24 month inspection opportunities shown).
Appendices D through M illustrate the changing optimal decisions as tank life
increases for each group. The best option early in tank life is to inspect (do nothing in
some less critical groups) but as the tank ages the optimal decision changes to overhaul
without inspection. In addition, late in the tank life the most costly decisions are to do
nothing or inspect only at 96 months. For the more critical tanks, the impact of missing a
needed overhaul opportunity becomes the driving force in the decision. For some groups
no calculation is made beyond the third period because the estimated probability of
survival for those groups beyond period four is zero. Also note that there is no calculation
for LUBE OIL tanks or CAT WING voids because the survival function for those groups




This model is sensitive to each of its input factors. The most-significant of which
are the tank's criticality factor and its survival function S(t). Sensitivity analysis of the
model is performed using JP-SERV group for the first 96 month period.
1. Survival Function
A simplification of the model is required in order to analyze how the survival
function affects the expected costs. The model is simplified to consider only one
inspection opportunity for the period. The probability of survival is taken to be the
probability p of surviving the entire 96 month period. With these simplifications the
expected costs for four decision options are compared. These decision options are:
1
.
Inspect the tank early enough in the 96 month period to schedule overhaul as
pre-planned work.
2. Inspect the tank after the start of the overhaul availability thus requiring any
overhaul ofthe tank to be scheduled as new work.
3. Overhaul the tank without inspection (scheduled as pre-planned work).
4. Do nothing.
Figure VI-6 shows the expected cost for the first 96 month period. As p changes there is
a change in the optimal decision. These changes are intuitive in the sense that it is optimal
to do nothing to a new tank, overhaul an old tank, and inspect those tanks in between.
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Expected Costs for Four Decision Options as a Function of















Figure VI-6 Sensitivity ofthe Inspection Decision Model to survival probability.
2. Criticality Factor
Assigning a value to a particular level of the criticality factor is up to the model
user. Chapter IV Section C describes the authors initial assigned value as a ranked level
of impact given the failure of any tank in each characterization group. This is the most
sensitive user input. Figure VI-7 shows how the criticality factor affects the optimal
decision. This figure shows that the costs increase and become more spread out as the
criticality factor increases. The difference in expected costs is driven by the effect of
missing a needed overhaul. As the level of criticality increases the potential for tank
failure after the last inspection but before the overhaul opportunity becomes a more
significant factor. Note that there is no chance of missing an overhaul ifthe inspection is
at the 96 month opportunity hence it's constant value.
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Expected Costs for Six Decision Options as a Function of
Criticality Factor
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Figure VI-7 Sensitivity ofInspection Decision Model to Criticality Factor.
3. Overhaul Cost
Figure VI-8 shows the sensitivity of the decision option to overhaul cost. The
costs of overhaul for the JP-5 tanks range from $25,000 to $81,000. While expected
costs vary linearly with overhaul cost the optimal decision is the same over most of the

















Figure VI-8 Sensitivity ofthe Inspection Decision Model to Overhaul Cost.
4. Inspection Cost
The costs of inspection for the JP-5 tanks range from $0 to $10,000. Figure VI-9
shows the sensitivity of the decision options to inspection cost. Again, while the expected
costs vary linearly with inspection costs the optimal decision remains the same. For this
group it is best to drive maintenance by inspection, regardless ofthe inspection cost.
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Expected Costs for Six Decision Options as a Function of
Inspection Cost
Insp @ 96 Months
• Insp @ 72 Months
Insp @ 48 Months
Insp @ 24 Months
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Figure VI-9 Sensitivity ofthe Inspection Decision Model to Inspection Cost.
F. COMPARISON OF THE ONE, TWO, AND THREE PERIOD
INSPECTION DECISION MODELS
The 96 month Inspection Decision Model is a decision aide to help the
maintenance planner decide upon near term inspection actions. It is intended to be used
iteratively after each overhaul availability. The single period model has 14 possible paths.
Multiple period models contain 14 n possible paths (where n is the number of periods).
Expansion of this model beyond three periods is not possible with the current software
package (DATA version 2.6.4 by TreAge Software Inc.). Figure VI- 10 shows the results
of the one, two and three period models. These results support the conjecture that the
downstream effects of a multiple period model do not significantly change the current
period decision given by the single period model. The basic decision ofwhether to
inspect, overhaul, or do nothing remains unchanged as model length increases. Timing of
when to inspect does change somewhat. The optimal inspection time (72 months) remains
constant while sub-optimal inspection at 48 months becomes less preferable than
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inspection at 96 months as the model length increases. However, an order of magnitude
difference exists between expected costs of performing either inspection compared to the
expected costs of the do nothing or overhaul options.
120,000
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JP-SERV 96 Month Inspection Decision Model Expected


















Figure VI-10 Comparison ofdecision option preferencesfor JP-SERV by period length
of96 month Inspection Decision Model.
Repeat of this comparison for the CAT EXH group results in the same
consistency. Figure VI- 1 1 shows the results. The basic decision of whether to inspect,
overhaul without inspection, or do nothing remains unchanged as the model length
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Figure VI-11 Comparison ofdecision option preferencesfor CATEXH by period length
of96 month Inspection Decision Model.
The only difference in inputs between the CAT EXH group and the JP-SERV
group is their survival functions, but their expected costs and optimal decisions differ
significantly. It is evident that changes in survival function effect the optimal decision
much more than extending the model from a single period to several periods. Hence, the
single period model is both adequate and robust for current planning needs.
G. INSPECTION DECISION MODEL SUMMARY
This chapter develops an analytic tool for determining inspection times for a tank
or void in a hypothetical 96 month period. This hypothetical period allows inspections at
each 24 month interval. The model inputs are survival function, criticality, overhaul cost,
and inspection cost. The choice of inspection times is most sensitive to the survival
function and criticality.
Even though this model is not entirely realistic, some observations extend to the
general case. The two most expensive options are to overhaul tanks with high probability
57

of survival and to do nothing to tanks with low probability of survival. Less costly options
are almost always to drive maintenance by inspection in the 96 month period.
The real benefit of this model is to see the long term effects of inspection
decisions on expected costs. Maintenance managers have not had a tool to quantify costs
over more than one inspection interval or to compare the costs of several options over the
different tank groups. This allows the maintenance managers to try different options and
to justify long term costs and budget.
Practical application of this model requires substitution of the actual overhaul
period length, times within that period when inspections may be performed, and the actual
probability of failure at each time within the period. When used to model a single tank the
actual cost of specifically inspecting and overhauling that tank should also be substituted.
This model can be adapted to include more or fewer inspection opportunities, secondary
inspection opportunities, and other realities of the actual inspection decision processes.
For example, for highly critical tanks such as JP-SERV, the option to schedule overhaul
then inspect at 96 months can be included. This option allows for pre-planning overhaul
for tanks that have failed and the ability to cancel overhaul on tanks that prove to be good.
The larger problem is to decide which tanks and voids to inspect, when the optimal
decision cannot be made on a tank by tank basis. This problem can be solved by a linear
program (Bazaraa, Jarvis, and Sherali 1 990) with the decision option costs as inputs.
Formulating this larger problem quantitatively is premature until the inputs, specifically the
estimates oftank and void survival functions, are credible.
Even in the single tank decision models, great care should be exercised when based
on the survival functions of Chapter V. The decision option outputs from this model can
be no better than the quality of data upon which the survival functions are determined, and




In the early portion of tank life the optimal decision is to not inspect at the 24
month availabilities. This optimal decision is sensitive to the probability of surviving the
first period. Current estimates of this probability are based on a few historical records of
questionable quality. Until more is known about the survival probabilities oftanks and
voids it is still prudent to inspect enough tanks of each group to ensure that the probability
of survival is large enough (usually > 90%) that the optimal decision remains the same.
An approach for determining the number oftanks to inspect is found in the CVN
71 FY 1997 EDSRA and CVN 73 FY 1997 SRA sampling plans provided to PERA(CV)
at the beginning of this study (Thornell and Whitaker "Development ofTank and Void
Inspection Recommendations for CVN 69, 71, 73"). Both CVN 71 and CVN 73 are
young enough (commissioned in October 1986 and July 1992 respectively) that the expert
opinion is that at most 5 to 10% of their tanks will fail by their FY 1997 inspection
opportunity. Thus, the optimal policy suggests no inspections. However, at the time the
plans were developed there was no data from these or other ships to support the 5 or 10%
figures. The data analyzed in chapter V became available the week of 01 April and full
analysis was not completed in time to be of benefit to these plans.
In both sampling plans tanks and voids are stratified according to the
characterization groups of Chapter III. Within each group, the smallest sample size was
found to meet a particular criteria. The criteria varied from group to group depending on
the number in the group, it's criticaliry, and what was known about the group prior to the
recommendation.
A. ACCEPTANCE SAMPLING
For the groups with criticality factor lower than 4 (J (FULL), LUBE OIL, SEA
WTR (FREQ), SEA WTR (INF), CAT WING VOIDS, SPONSON, and DRY) the
criteria used is analogous to that of acceptance sampling (Duncan 1986). Here the goal is
to have a sample size large enough to detect groups for which the true proportion of failed
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tanks is higher than the value hypothesized by the planning managers. Levels of
significance and power are chosen, for each group and are given in the sampling plan.
Specifically, let r be the unknown number of failed tanks in a group o£size N. Test the
null hypothesis that r < r verses the alternative that r > r where r is close to some
percentage ofN, typically 10%. The test statistic for this test is X, the number of failed
tanks out of a sample of size n where X has a Hypergeometric distribution with
parameters N, r, n. For this test the decision rule is of the form reject H (i.e., decide that




r = r ) = a
P(x>c | r=r) = \-p
where a is the level of significance and 1-P is the power of the test when r = r x ,and
ri>r .
The solution ofn and c require enumerating Hypergeometric probabilities for each
possible n and for both r and r\ . This gives sample sizes slightly smaller than found in
the usual acceptance sampling plans (IAW Mil Std 105D) which are based on a Normal
approximation of the distribution.
B. CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
For groups of criticality four or those for which there was some evidence (perhaps
anecdotal) that the percentage of failed tanks is higher than expected, the sample size is
chosen to give a confidence interval for the population of failed tanks with a specified
width and level of confidence. For the smaller groups the sample size was computed to
give a lower confidence band for the true number of failed tanks with a specified level of
confidence. There is no closed form expression for exact Hypergeometric confidence
intervals thus the sample size is determined iteratively. For larger groups the sample size
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was chosen to give a certain width two sided approximate confidence interval for r. This
interval is given by:





where Z(a/2 ) is the (l-ct/2) quantile of a Standard Normal and b = N*(X/n) is the MLE for
C. SAMPLING
Once sample sizes for each group are determined, a simple random sample of
tanks is selected. This sample is generated using a computer to select tanks at random
without replacement. Included in the recommendations are the list of tank and void
designation numbers ofthose selected for inspection. The fact that tanks were chosen at
random within each group is an important and key feature ofthe sampling plan. This
allows for unbiased estimates of the proportion of failed tanks or inference with the
desired power and level of significance. Without the random sampling, bias can be
introduced into the estimates of the proportion of failed tanks. As in the case ofthe SEA
WTR (INF) tanks discussed in Chapter V. Ifrandom sampling is performed at each
opportunity that the group of tanks is inspected, then this data can be used to form
unbiased estimates ofthe survival function.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
A major contribution of this thesis is the stratification of Nimitz class aircraft
carrier tanks and voids into ten groups along with the assignment of a criticality factor to
each group. These groups were determined based on engineering considerations. Choice
of these groups is validated by both expert opinion and the data analysis of Chapter V.
These groups and criticality factors can be extended to other classes of ships and have
already been used for conventional powered aircraft carriers CV 63 and CV 64.
A second contribution is the demonstration of methods to estimate the survival
function of tank and void coating lifetimes based on the records found in the T&VDB.
All of this data is interval censored. Analysis of the data needs to account for this
censoring which includes coating lifetimes of tanks that have failed between inspections,
prior to the first inspection, and those that have not failed as of their last inspection. The
actual estimates of survival function given in Chapter V are based on data of questionable
quality.
The third contribution is development of a decision tool to plan inspections of a
tank or void in the 96 month period between overhauls. While this model is preliminary
and based on the data of Chapter V, it does demonstrate the cost effectiveness of driving
maintenance by inspection of tanks and voids between overhaul opportunities. It also
provides a methodology for quantifying long term costs of various maintenance options.
This gives the managers a tool to plan and budget over multiyear periods. There is
enough flexibility in this model so that it can be tailored to a specific tank or void and to
include decision options not considered in this thesis. In addition, this model can form the
foundation of an optimization model that plans inspection for multiple tank (of possibly
differing ages and types) simultaneously. However, until better estimates of the survival
function of coating lifetimes is available such an extension is premature.
Finally, the methods used to develop the sampling plans provided to AIRLANT for
CVN 71 1997 EDSRA and CVN 73 1997 SRA are included. These sampling plans were
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developed to obtain unbiased estimates of the current proportion of failed tanks within
each group. By using plans such as these and recording the results in the T&VDB over a
long period of time and for tanks with different (and known) coating ages, unbiased
estimates of the survival function for each group can be computed.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
There are several immediate and long term recommendations and suggestions that
have come to light during the research of this thesis. Some of these recommendations are
not new but are included here for emphasis and completeness.
1. Immediate Recommendations:
a) Update PMS MRC cards for all tank and void inspections to
specifically require that records of all inspections of tanks and voids
be entered into the T&VDB. Without this, data will not be
recorded reliably.
b) Establish the position of ship's Tank and Void Coordinator
as a single point of contact for shipboard tank and void inspection
and maintenance issues. This would be a collateral duty position
similar to that of the ship's Calibration Coordinator.).
c) Establish a formal path and periodicity for data updates of
PERA(CV)'s comprehensive T&VDB from the ship's T&VDB.
Make this data available to the maintenance managers and analysts
as quickly as possible. Establishing an FTP site or home page on
the Internet with the latest version ofT&VDB could serve this
purpose.
d) Make the results of inspections immediately useable by the
maintenance manager. A suggestion is to construct a periodic
report based on T&VDB. This tracking report, with appropriate
summary statistics and graphs, should be available well before even
Work Definition Conference where inspection and maintenance are
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pre-planned for the upcoming availability. Such a report can be
constructed in EXCEL using Visual Basic linked to an ACCESS
compatible T&VDB. This report can easily include comparisons of
inspection and maintenance options using decision tools illustrated
in this thesis.
2. Long Term Recommendations Once T&VDB is Established
a) Analyses in this thesis are based on very coarse inspection
data, specifically whether a tank coating failed (a condition three or
four was scored) or not. When recorded, there is a wealth of
information that results from inspections. For example, there are
fields in the T&VDB for recording the actual condition of the
coating (1, 2, 3, or 4) as a function of position (top, sides, bottom).
These can be used to refine the survival analysis to better predict
how long a tank will last in its' current state and what the most
likely failure will be. All ofthe information in the T&VDB needs to
be exploited.
b) Tank coating survival functions should be updated for each
ship based on its T&VDB data. This tailors analysis to each ship's
condition functions rather than relying on aggregate survival
function estimates for the class.
c) Explore tradeoffs between options based on new technology
such as:
(1) Improved coating and cathodic protection materials.
(2) New methods of inspection such as using a fiber-
optic scope to inspect without personnel entering
the actual tank.
(3) Collecting different types of information to track
coating decay. For example, the use of ultrasonic
probes to measure coating thickness or develop
chemical analyses to monitor coating deterioration
from tank contents samples.
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d) Expand the decision tool to plan inspections for groups of
tanks taking into account realistic budget and timing constraints.
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APPENDIX A. CVN 69 INSPECTION DATA SUMMARY FQR 1986 AND 1995
INSPECTIONS
Tanks at risk of failure at approx imately 105 months after overhaul
CHAR GRP TOTAL # TANKS # INSPECTED #FAIL
SPONSON 8 2 2
SEA WTR (FREQ) 51 25 23
J (TRANS) 30 27 19
J (FULL) 269 247 157
CAT EXH 4 3 1
JP-SERV 37 28 8
SEA WTR (INF) 102 75 23
DRY 272 38 9
CAT WING VOID 232
LUBE-OIL 53 1
Figure A-l Summary ofCVN 69 tanks at risk ofcoatingfailure as observedfrom tank
inspections at approximately 105 months ofcoating age.
Tanks at risk of failure at approximately 210 months after overhaul
CHAR GRP TOTAL # TANKS # INSPECTED #FAIL
SPONSON 6 5 4
SEA WTR (FREQ) 22 5 3
J (TRANS) 6 5 4
J (FULL) 65 59 43
CAT EXH 2
JP-SERV 23 17 11
SEA WTR (INF) 60 30 12
DRY 227 20 4
CAT WING VOID 232
LUBE-OIL 53 40
Figure A-2 Summary ofCVN 69 tanks at risk ofcoatingfailure as observedfrom tank
















CUMULATIVE COATING FAILURE VS AGE









Figure A-3 Observed Cumulative Tank Coating Failurefor CVN 69, by Characterization
Group, for tanks inspected at approximately 105 and 210 months ofCoating age.
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APPENDIX B. CVN 71 INSPECTION DATA SUMMARY FOR 1989, 1991, AND
1995 INSPECTIONS
Tanks at risk of fai lure at approximately 34 months after overhaul
CHAR GROUP TOTAL # TANKS # INSPECTED # FAIL
SPONSON 8
SEA WTR (FREQ) 39
J (TRANS) 20
J (FULL) 172 1
CAT EXH 3
JP-SERV 30
SEA WTR (INF) 84
DRY 253 6
CAT WING VOID 232
LUBE-OIL 53
Figure B-l Summary ofCVN 71 tanks at risk ofcoatingfailure as observedfrom tank
inspections at approximately 34 months ofcoating age.
Tanks at risk of fai lure at approximcitely 61 months after overhaul
CHAR GROUP TOTAL # TANKS # INSPECTED # FAIL
SPONSON 8 1
SEA WTR (FREQ) 39 3
J (TRANS) 20
J (FULL) 172 17
CAT EXH 3 3 2
JP-SERV 30 7
SEA WTR (INF) 84 11 3
DRY 253 15 1
CAT WING VOID 232
LUBE-OIL 53
Figure B-2 Summary ofCVN 71 tanks at risk ofcoatingfailure as observedfrom tank
inspections at approximately 61 months ofcoating age.
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Tanks at risk of fai lure at approximately 112 months after overhaul
CHAR GROUP TOTAL # TANKS # INSPECTED # FAIL
SPONSON 8
SEA WTR (FREQ) 39 3 1
J (TRANS) 20 1
J (FULL) 172 6
CAT EXH 3
JP-SERV 30 15
SEA WTR (INF) 84 14 13
DRY 253 26 8
CAT WING VOID 232
LUBE-OIL 53 2
Figure B-3 Summary ofCVN 71 tanks at risk ofcoatingfailure as observedfrom tank
inspections at approximately 112 months ofcoating age.
CUMULATIVE COATING FAILURE VS AGE








































Figure B-4 Observed Cumulative Tank Coating Failurefor CVN 71, by Characterization
Group, for tanks inspected at approximately 34, 61, and 112 months of Coating age.
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APPENDIX C. CVN 72 INSPECTION DATA SUMMARY FOR 1996
INSPECTIONS
Tanks at risk of failure at app roximately 75 months after overhaul
CHAR GRP TOTAL* TANKS # INSPECTED # FAIL
SPONSON 7 2
SEA WTR (FREQ) 38 6
J (TRANS) 30 7
J (FULL) 167 48
CAT EXH 3 2 1
JP-SERV 30 10
SEA WTR (INF) 84 62 23
DRY 252 57 5
CAT WING VOID 232
LUBE-OIL 53
Figure C-l Summary ofCVN 72 tanks at risk ofcoatingfailure as observedfrom tank
inspections at approximately 75 months ofcoating age.












































Figure C-2 Observed Cumulative Tank Coating Failurefor CVN 72, by
Characterization Group, for tanks inspected at approximately 75 months ofCoating age.
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APPENDIX D. JP-SERV GROUP
This appendix provides a summary ofthe number of inspections, their times and
the results ofthose inspections for JP Service group tanks on the CVN 69, CVN 71, and
CVN 72. It also provides the plots that support the data analysis in Chapter V and figures
that support the decision analysis of Chapter VI.
TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
JP-SERV GROUP, CVN 69
DESIGNATION # TANKS INSPECTION COH '86 COH "95 COH '95
CODE (99 MOS) (117 MOS) (216 MOS)
JP SERV 26 IOH: 7 1 11
ICO: 16 4 6
NICO: 3 2 2
AUX JP SERV 4 IOH:
ICO:
NICO: 4 4
COMBINED 30 IOH: 7 1 11
ICO: 16 4 6
NICO: 7 2 6
% FAIL 30.43 20.00 64.71
CUM % FAIL 30.43 20.00 75.45
TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -105 -210
# INSPECTED 28 17
# FAILED 8 11
% (OF INSPECTED) FAILED 28.57 64.71
INSPECTION CODE KEY
IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure D-l Summary ofJP-SERV Group tank inspections onboard CVN 69 recorded
from Complex Overhaul (COH) periods in 1986 and 1995. Note that tanks overhauled in
1986 have younger lives than those not yet overhauled in 1995.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
JP-SERV GROUP, CVN 71
DESIGNATION # TANKS INSPECTION SRA '89 SRA '91 SRA '95
CODE (34 MOS) (61 MOS) (112 MOS)
JP SERV 26 IOH
ICO 7 15
NICO 26 19 11
AUX JP SERV 4 IOH
ICO
NICO 4 4 4
COMBINED 30 IOH
ICO 7 15
NICO 30 23 15
% FAIL 0.00 0.00 0.00
CUM % FAIL 0.00 0.00 0.00
TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -34 -61 -112
# INSPECTED 7 15
# FAILED
% (OF INSPECTED) FAILED 0.00 0.00
INSPECTION CODE KEY
IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure D-2 Summary ofJP-SERV Group tank inspections onboard CVN 71 recorded
from Selective Restricted Availability (SRA) periods in 1989, 1991, and 1995.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
JP-SERV GROUP, CVN 72
DESIGNATION # TANKS INSPECTION EDSRA '96
CODE (-75 MOS)
JP SERV 26 IOH
ICO 8
NICO 16








TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -75
# INSPECTED 10
# FAILED
% (OF INSPECTED) FAILED
INSPECTION CODE KEY
IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure D-3 Summary ofJP-SERV Group tank inspections onboard CVN 72 recorded
from 1996 Extended Dry-docking Selective Restricted Availability (EDSRA).
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JP-SERV Scale (b)
Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.950
Bivariate
Mean Std Dev Correlation Signif. Prob
>
NumberVariable
JP-SERV Scale (b) 206.29 9.88 0.28 0.005 100
JP-SERV Shape (a) 2.7768 0.27
J
V J
Figure D-4 Bootstrapped estimates and 95% confidence ellipsefor Weibullparameters
ofShape (a) and Scale (P)for the JP-SERVgroup. (Thisfigure is a screen capturefrom
JMP version 3.1.6 by SAS Institute Inc.)
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JP-SERV Tank Estimated Survival Function
c/>
•90% Upper Confidence Limit
90% Lower Confidence Limit
Estimated Weibu II, S(t)
Nonparametric Estimate of S(t)
48 98 148 198 248 298
t (months)
348 398 448 498
Figure D-5 Maximum Likelihoodfit (with 90% confidence bounds) of Weibull
distribution describing the survivalfunction S(t) oftank coatingsfor JP-SERV Group
tanks compared to the nonparametric survival distribution.
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Figure D-6 Maximum Likelihoodfits ofparametric and nonparametric candidate
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Figure D- 7 96 month JP-SERV Group Tank Inspection Decision Model. (Thisfigure is
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Figure D-8 Roll-back ofJP-SERV Group Tank Inspection Decision Model showing
expected costs and recommended action to take during the first 96 month period oftank
coating life. (Thisfigure is a screen capturefrom DATA version 2.6.4 by TreAge
Software Inc.)
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JP-SERV Tank Expected Model Costs for Each Decision
Option Over Five 96 Month Periods













96 M onth Period
Figure D-9 Expected Model costsfor various JP-SERV Group tank inspection decision
options over the firstfive 96 month periods oftank coating life.
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APPENDIX E . J (TRANS) GROUP
This appendix provides a summary ofthe number of inspections, their times and
the results of those inspections for J(TRANS) group tanks on the CVN 69, CVN 71, and
CVN 72. It also provides the plots that support the data analysis in Chapter V and figures
that support the decision analysis of Chapter VI.
TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
J (TRANS) GROUP, CVN 69































































IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure E-l Summary o/JfTRANS) Group tank inspections onboard CVN 69 recorded
from Complex Overhaul (COH) periods in 1986 and 1995. Note that tanks overhauled in
1986 have younger lives than those not yet overhauled in 1995.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
J (TRANS) GROUP, CVN 71










































TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -34
# INSPECTED
# FAILED









lOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure E-2 Summary o/J(TRANS) Group tank inspections onboard CVN 71 recorded
from Selective Restricted Availability (SRA) periods in 1989, 1991, and 1995.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
J (TRANS) GROUP, CVN 72






















TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -75
# INSPECTED 7
# FAILED
% (OF INSPECTED) FAILED
INSPECTION CODE KEY
lOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure E-3 Summary ofJfTRANS) Group tank inspections onboard CVN 72 recorded
from 1996 Extended Dry-docking Selective Restricted Availability (EDSRA).
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Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.950
Bivariate
Variable Mean Std Dev Correlation S
J (TRANS) Scale (b) 110.14 10.71 0.01






Figure E-4 Bootstrapped estimates and 95% confidence ellipsefor Weibullparameters
ofShape (a) and Scale (p) for the J(TRANS) group. (Thisfigure is a screen capture
from JMP version 3.1.6 by SAS Institute Inc.)
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J (TRANS) Estimated Tank Survival Function
w
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
t (months)
Figure E-5 Maximum Likelihoodfit (with 90% confidence bounds) of Weibull
distribution describing the survivalfunction S(t) oftank coatingsfor JfTRANS) Group
tanks compared to the nonparametric survival distribution.
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Figure E-6 Maximum Likelihoodfits ofparametric and nonparametric candidate
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Figure E-7 96 month JfTRANS) Group Tank Inspection Decision Model. (Thisfigure is
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Figure E-8 Roll-back ofJ(TRANS) Group Tank Inspection Decision Model showing
expected costs and recommended action to take during the first 96 month period oftank




J (TRANS) Tank Expected Model Costs for Each Decision
Option Over Three 96 Month Periods













Figure E-9 Expected Model costsfor various JfTRANS) Group tank inspection decision
options over the first three 96 month periods oftank coating life.
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APPENDIX F. J (FULL) GROUP
This appendix provides a summary of the number of inspections, their times and
the results of those inspections for J(FULL) Group tanks on the CVN 69, CVN 71, and
CVN 72. It also provides the plots that support the data analysis in Chapter V and figures
that support the decision analysis of Chapter VI.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
J (FULL) GROUP, CVN 69
DESIGNATION #TANKS INSPECTION COH '86 COH "95 COH '95
CODE (99 MOS) (117 MOS) (216 MOS)
JB 52 IOH: 26 17 19
ICO: 24 7 5
NICO: 2 2 2






JOB 30 IOH: 20 11 6
ICO: 8 5 1
NICO: 2 4 3
JOB NSFO 6 IOH: 6 3
ICO: 2
NICO: 1
JP 58 IOH: 32 16 18
ICO: 22 12 7
NICO: 4 4 1
JP NSFO 16 IOH: 16 6
ICO: 10
NICO:
COMBINED 167 IOH: 102 55 43
ICO: 54 36 16
NICO: 11 11 6
% FAIL 65.38 60.44 72.88
CUM % FAIL 65.38 60.44 90.61
TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS -105 -210
# INSPECTED 247 59
# FAILED 157 43
% OF INSP. FAILED 63.56 72.88
INSPECTION CODE KEY
IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure F-l Summary ofJ(FULL) Group tank inspections onboard CVN 69 recorded
from Complex Overhaul (COH) periods in 1986 and 1995. Note that tanks overhauled in
1986 have younger lives than those not yet overhauled in 1995.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
J (FULL) GROUP, CVN 71
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TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -34
# INSPECTED 1
# FAILED








IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULEC
Figure F-2 Summary ofJ(FULL) Group tank inspections onboard CVN 71 recorded
from Selective Restricted Availability (SRA) periods in 1989, 1991, and 1995.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
J (FULL) GROUP, CVN 72


















































= INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
= INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
= NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure F-3 Summary ofJ(FULL) Group tank inspections onboard CVN 72 recorded
from 1996 Extended Dry-docking Selective Restricted Availability (EDSRA).
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Figure F-4 Bootstrapped estimates and 95% confidence ellipsefor Weibull parameters
ofShape (a) and Scale (P) for the J(FULL) group. (Thisfigure is a screen capturefrom








J (FULL) Estimated Tank Survival Function
1 90% Upper Confidence Limit
90% Low er Confidence Limit
Estimated Weibull, S(t)
Nonparametric Estimate of S(t)
50 100 150 200 250 300
t (months)
350 400 450 500
Figure F-5 Maximum Likelihoodfit (with 90% confidence bounds) of Weibull
distribution describing the survivalfunction S(t) oftank coatingsfor J(FULL) Group
tanks compared to the nonparametric survival distribution.









Figure F-6 Maximum Likelihoodfits ofparametric and nonparametric candidate





96 Month Cycle Model TankMtac Decision
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Figure F-7 96 month J(FULL) Group Tank Inspection Decision Model. (Thisfigure is a
screen capturefrom DATA version 2.6.4 by TreAge Software Inc.)
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J (FULL)
96 Month Cycle Model Tank Mine Decision
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Figure F-8 Roll-back ofJ(FULL) Group Tank Inspection Decision Model showing
expected costs and recommended action to take during the first 96 month period oftank
coating life. (Thisfigure is a screen capturefrom DATA version 2.6.4 by TreAge
Software Inc.)
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J (FULL) Tank Expected Model Costs for Each Decision
Option Over Five 96 Month Periods













96 M onth Period
Figure F-9 Expected Model costsfor various J(FULL) Group tank inspection decision
options over the firstfive 96 month periods oftank coating life.
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APPENDIX G. LUBE OIL GROUP
This appendix provides a summary of the number of inspections, their times and
the results ofthose inspections for J(FULL) Group tanks on the CVN 69, CVN 71, and
CVN 72. It also provides the plots that support the data analysis in Chapter V and figures
that support the decision analysis of Chapter VI.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
LUBE-OIL GROUP, CVN 69
















































lOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure G-l Summary ofLUBE-OIL Group tank inspections onboard CVN 69 recorded
from Complex Overhaul (COH) periods in 1986 and 1995. Note that tanks overhauled in
1986 have younger lives than those not yet overhauled in 1995.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
LUBE-OIL GROUP, CVN 71










NICO 3 3 3
AUX-LO-STOW 4 lOH
ICO
NICO 4 4 4
LO 3 lOH
ICO
NICO 3 3 3





LO STOW 28 lOH
ICO














TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -34
# INSPECTED
# FAILED







lOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure G-2 Summary ofLUBE-OIL Group tank inspections onboard CVN 71 recorded
from Selective Restricted Availability (SRA) periods in 1989, 1991, and 1995.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
LUBE-OIL GROUP, CVN 72











LO SET 15 lOH
ICO
NICO 15








TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -75
# INSPECTED
# FAILED
% (OF INSPECTED) FAILED
INSPECTION CODE KEY
lOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure G-3 Summary ofLUBE-OIL Group tank inspections onboard CVN 72 recorded
from 1996 Extended Dry-docking Selective Restricted Availability (EDSRA).
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APPENDIX H. SEA WTR (FREQ) GROUP
This appendix provides a summary of the number of inspections, their times and
the results of those inspections for SEA WTR (FREQ) Group tanks on the CVN 69, CVN
71, and CVN 72. It also provides the plots that support the data analysis in Chapter V
and figures that support the decision analysis of Chapter VI.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
SEA WTR (FREQ) GROUP, CVN 69























OVERFLOW BOX 11 IOH:
ICO:
NICO: 11 11




















































IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure H-l Summary ofSEA WTR (FREQ) Group tank inspections onboard CVN 69
recordedfrom Complex Overhaul (COH) periods in 1986 and 1995. Note that tanks
overhauled in 1986 have younger lives than those not yet overhauled in 1995.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
SEA WTR (FREQ) GROUP, CVN 71















PEAK SWB 2 lOH
ICO
NICO 2 2 2






ONBD DISCHG S. 5 lOH
ICO
NICO 5 5 5
FRS WTR CLC 4 lOH
ICO
NICO 4 4 4
DIRTY DRN CLC 6 lOH
ICO

















TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -34
# INSPECTED
# FAILED









lOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULEC )
Figure H-2 Summary ofSEA WTR (FREQ) Group tank inspections onboard CVN 71
recordedfrom Selective Restricted Availability (SRA) periods in 1989, 1991, and 1995.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
SEA WTR (FREQ) GROUP, CVN 72
DESIGNATION # TANKS INSPECTION EDSRA '96
CODE (75MOS)
VOID LC 10 IOH
ICO 6
NICO 4
PEAK SWB 2 IOH
ICO
NICO 2
OVERFLOW BOX 11 IOH
ICO
NICO 11














TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -75
# INSPECTED 6
# FAILED
% (OF INSPECTED) FAILED
INSPECTION CODE KEY
IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure H-3 Summary ofSEA WTR (FREQ) Group tank inspections onboard CVN 72
recordedfrom 1996 Extended Dry-docking Selective Restricted Availability (EDSRA).
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Sea Wtr (Freq) Scale (b)




jlation Signif Prob NumberVariable Mean Std Dev Corre
Sea Wtr (Freq) Scale (b) 120.49 10.84 0.36 .0003 100
Sea Wtr (Freq) Shape (a) 1.5489 0.1602
^ )
X ,)
Figure H-4 Bootstrapped estimates and 95% confidence ellipsefor Weibull parameters
ofShape (a) and Scale (P) for the SEA WTR (FREQ) group. (Thisfigure is a screen
capturefrom JMP version 3.1.6 by SAS Institute Inc.)
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SEA WTR (FREQ) Estimated Tank Survival Function
w
90% Upper Confidence Limit
90% Lower Confidence Limit
Estimated Weibull, S(t)
Nonparametric Estimate of S(t)
50 100 150 200 250 300 350
t (months)
400 450 500
Figure H-5 Maximum Likelihoodfit (with 90% confidence bounds) of Weibull
distribution describing the survivalfunction S(t) oftank coatingsfor SEA WTR (FREQ)
Group tanks compared to the nonparametric survival distribution.







Figure H-6 Maximum Likelihoodfits ofparametric and nonparametric candidate





96 Month Cycle Model Tank Mtnc Decision

























































































































Figure H-7 96 month SEA WTR (FREQ) Group Tank Inspection Decision Model. (This






















































































































EipMthcCost = $5,000, P-0.473
Exp_Mtnc_Cost = $50,000; P « 0.142








Figure H-8 Roll-back ofSEA WTR (FREQ) Group Tank Inspection Decision Model
showing expected costs and recommended action to take during the first 96 month period
oftank coating life. (Thisfigure is a screen capturefrom DATA version 2.6.4 by TreAge
Software Inc.)
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SEA WTR (FREQ) Expected Model Costs for Each Decision
Option Over Five 96 Month Periods










96 M onfn Period
Figure H-9 Expected Model costsfor various SEA WTR (FREQ) Group tank inspection
decision options over the firstfive 96 month periods oftank coating life.
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APPENDIX I. SEA WTR (INF) GROUP
This appendix provides a summary of the number of inspections, their times and
the results of those inspections for SEA WTR (INF) Group tanks on the CVN 69, CVN
71, and CVN 72. It also provides the plots that support the data analysis in Chapter V
and figures that support the decision analysis of Chapter VI.
TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
SEA WTR (INF) GROUP, CVN 69
DESIGNATION # TANKS INSPECTION COH '86 COH '95 COH '95
CODE (99 MOS) (117 MOS) (216 MOS)
DC 27 IOH: 3 2 5
ICO: 13 1 9
NICO: 11 4
VOID DC 57 IOH: 15 3 7
ICO: 36 2 9
NICO: 6 10 26
COMBINED 84 IOH: 18 5 12
ICO: 49 3 18
NICO: • 17 10 30
% FAIL 26.87 62.50 40.00
CUM % FAIL 26.87 62.50 56.12
TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -105 -210
# INSPECTED 75 30
# FAILED 23 12
% (OF INSPECTED) FAILED 30.67 40.00
INSPECTION CODE KEY
IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure 1-1 Summary ofSEA WTR (INF) Group tank inspections onboard CVN 69
recordedfrom Complex Overhaul (COH) periods in 1986 and 1995. Note that tanks
overhauled in 1986 have younger lives than those not yet overhauled in 1995.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
SEA WTR (INF) GROUP, CVN 71
DESIGNATION # TANKS INSPECTION SRA '89 SRA '91 SRA '95
CODE (34 MOS) (61 wros) (112 MOS)
DC 27 IOH 1 1
ICO 1 1
NICO 27 25 25
VOID DC 57 IOH 2 12
ICO 7
NICO 57 48 45
COMBINED 84 IOH 3 13
ICO 8 1
NICO 84 73 70
% FAIL 0.00 27.27 92.86
CUM % FAIL 0.00 27.27 92.86
TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -34 -61 -112
# INSPECTED 11 14
# FAILED 3 13
% (OF INSPECTED) FAILED 0.00 27.27 92.86
INSPECTION CODE KEY
IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure 1-2 Summary ofSEA WTR (INF) Group tank inspections onboard CVN 71
recordedfrom Selective Restricted Availability (SRA) periods in 1989, 1991, and 1995.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
SEA WTR (INF) GROUP, CVN 72
DESIGNATION # TANKS INSPECTION EDSRA '96
CODE (75MOS)
DC 27 IOH 3
ICO 6
NICO 18
VOID DC 57 IOH 20
ICO 33
NICO 4




CUM % FAIL 37.10
TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -75
# INSPECTED 62
# FAILED 23
% (OF INSPECTED) FAILED 37.10
INSPECTION CODE KEY
IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure 1-3 Summary ofSEA WTR (INF) Group tank inspections onboard CVN 72
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150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250
Sea Wtr (Inf) Scale (b)




Variable Mean Std Dev Correlation Signif. Prob Number
Sea Wtr (Inf) Scale (b) 198.89 15.186 0.2 0.05 100
Sea Wtr (Inf) Shape (a) 1.0652 0.0568
v J
V )
Figure 1-4 Bootstrapped estimates and 95% confidence ellipse for Weibull parameters of
Shape (a) and Scale (ft) for the SEA WTR (INF) group. (Thisfigure is a screen capture
from JMP version 3.1.6 by SAS Institute Inc.)
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SEA WTR (INF) Estimated Tank Survival Function
• 90% Upper Confidence Lirrit
90% Low er Confidence Lirrit
Estimated Weibull, S(t)
Nonparametric Estimate of S(t)
50 100 150 200 250 300
t (months)
350 400 450 500
Figure 1-5 Maximum Likelihoodfit (with 90% confidence bounds) of Weibull
distribution describing the survivalfunction S(t) oftank coatingsfor SEA WTR (INF)
Group tanks compared to the nonparametric survival distribution.
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Figure 1-6 Maximum Likelihoodfits ofparametric and nonparametric candidate
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Figure 1-7 96 month SEA WTR (INF) Group Tank Inspection Decision Model. (This
figure is a screen capturefrom DATA version 2.6.4 by TreAge Software Inc.)
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SEA WATER (INF)
96 Month Cycle Mode! Tack Mine. Decision
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Figure 1-8 Roll-back ofSEA WTR (INF) Group Tank Inspection Decision Model
showing expected costs and recommended action to take during the first 96 month period
oftank coating life. (Thisfigure is a screen capturefrom DATA version 2.6.4 by TreAge
Software Inc.)
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SEA WTR (INF) Tank Expected Model Costs for Each
Decision Option Over Five 96 Month Periods









Figure 1-9 Expected Model costsfor various SEA WTR (INF) Group tank inspection
decision options over the firstfive 96 month periods oftank coating life.
122

APPENDIX J. CAT WING VOID GROUP
This appendix provides a summary of the number of inspections, their times and
the results of those inspections for CAT WING VOID Group tanks on the CVN 69, CVN
71, and CVN 72. It also provides the plots that support the data analysis in Chapter V
and figures that support the decision analysis of Chapter VI.
TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
CAT WING VOID GROUP, CVN 69























= INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
= INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
= NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure J-l Summary ofCAT WING VOID Group tank inspections onboard CVN 69
recordedfrom Complex Overhaul (COH) periods in 1986 and 1995. Note that tanks
overhauled in 1986 have younger lives than those not yet overhauled in 1995.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
CAT WING VOID GROUP, CVN 71
















TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY





= INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
= INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
= NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure J-2 Summary ofCAT WING VOID Group tank inspections onboard CVN 71
recordedfrom Selective Restricted Availability (SRA) periods in 1989, 1991, and 1995.
CAT WING VOID GROUP, CVN 72
DESIGNATION # TANKS INSPECTION EDSRA'96
CODE (75 MOS)





TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -75
# INSPECTED
# FAILED
% (OF INSPECTED) FAILED
INSPECTION CODE KEY
lOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure J-3 Summary ofCA T WING VOID Group tank inspections onboard CVN 72
recordedfrom 1996 Extended Dry-docking Selective Restricted Availability (EDSRA).
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APPENDIX K. CAT EXH GROUP
This appendix provides a summary ofthe number of inspections, their times and
the results ofthose inspections for CATAPULT EXHAUST VOID Group tanks on the
CVN 69, CVN 71, and CVN 72. It also provides the plots that support the data analysis
in Chapter V and figures that support the decision analysis of Chapter VI.
TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
CAT EXHAUST GROUP, CVN 69





























IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure K-l Summary ofCATEXH VOID Group tank inspections onboard CVN 69
recordedfrom Complex Overhaul (COH) periods in 1986 and 1995. Note that tanks
overhauled in 1986 have younger lives than those not yet overhauled in 1995.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
CAT EXHAUST GROUP, CVN 71
DESIGNATION # TANKS INSPECTION SRA '89 SRA '91 SRA '95
CODE (34 MOS) (61 tfOS) (112 MOS)
CATAPULT EXH 3 IOH 2
ICO 1
NICO 3 3
% FAIL 0.00 66.67 0.00
CUM % FAIL 0.00 66.67 66.67
TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -34 -61 -112
# INSPECTED 3
# FAILED 2
% (OF INSPECTED) FAILED 0.00 66.67 0.00
INSPECTION CODE KEY
IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure K-2 Summary ofCATEXH VOID Group tank inspections onboard CVN 71
recordedfrom Selective Restricted Availability (SRA) periods in 1989, 1991. and 1995.
TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
CAT WING VOID GROUP, CVN 72

















IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure K-3 Summary ofCA T EXH VOID Group tank inspections onboard CVN 72
recordedfrom 1996 Extended Dry-docking Selective Restricted Availability (EDSRA).
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feat Void Shape (a) By Cat Void Scale (b) j
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Variable Mean Std Dev Correlc
Cat Void Scale (b) 97.44939 54.76717 0.173
Cat Void Shape (a) 0.794159 0.267866
V
V
Figure K-4 Bootstrapped estimates and 95% confidence ellipsefor Weibullparameters
ofShape (a) and Scale (P) for the CATEXH VOID group. (Thisfigure is a screen
capturefrom JMP version 3.1.6 by SAS Institute Inc.)
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Figure K-5 Maximum LikelihoodJit (with 90% confidence bounds) of Weibull
distribution describing the survivalfunction S(t) oftank coatingsfor CATEXH VOID
Group tanks compared to the nonparametric survival distribution.
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Figure K-6 Maximum Likelihoodfits ofparametric and nonparametric candidate
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Figure K-7 96 month CATEXH VOID Group Tank Inspection Decision Model. (This
figure is a screen capturefrom DATA version 2.6.4 by TreAge Software Inc.)
129
CATAPULT EXHAUST VOIDS
% Month Cycle Model Tank Mtnc Decision
















































Iisp_Cost=INSP || Wgj6 Months
3nsl
bsp @ 72 Months : $42^14
Overhaul Cost=NWOH I










C $K<587'6 1 Good@ 72 iY |
i





En:_Mtn:_Cost = $65,000, P = 0549
0549
Good© 48 Months
Good@ 96 1 Good® 48
0.690
< EiF.Mta;.Cost = $5,000




$42235 < | Good® 48
Mrs Cost=OPPC*50









Good® 96 1 Good® 24
0548






























Figure K-8 Roll-back ofCATEXH VOID Group Tank Inspection Decision Model
showing expected costs and recommended action to take during the first 96 month period
oftank coating life. (Thisfigure is a screen capturefrom DATA version 2.6.4 by TreAge
Software Inc.)
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CAT EXH Void Expected Model Costs for Each Decision
Option Over Five 96 Month Periods
250,000
200,000
l@ 96 il@ 72 |l@ 48 ll O 24 lOVHL |DN
96 Month Period
Figure K-9 Expected Model costsfor various CATEXH VOID Group tank inspection
decision options over the firstfive 96 month periods oftank coating life.
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APPENDIX L. DRY GROUP
This appendix provides a summary of the number of inspections, their times and
the results ofthose inspections for DRY Group tanks on the CVN 69, CVN 71, and CVN
72. It also provides the plots that support the data analysis in Chapter V and figures that
support the decision analysis of Chapter VI.
TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
DRY GROUP, CVN 69



































































= INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
= INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
= NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure L-l Summary ofDRY Group tank inspections onboard CVN 69 recordedfrom
Complex Overhaul (COH) periods in 1986 and 1995. Note that tanks overhauled in
1986 have younger lives than those not yet overhauled in 1995.
133
TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
DRY GROUP, CVN 71
DESIGNATION # TANKS INSPECTION SRA '89 SRA '91 SRA "95
CODE (34 MOS) (61 MOS) (112 MOS)
COFFERDAMS 33 IOH
ICO
NICO 33 33 33
VOIDS 220 IOH 1 8
ICO 6 14 18
NICO 214 205 194
COMBINED 253 IOH 1 8
ICO 6 14 18
NICO 247 238 227
% FAIL 0.00 6.67 30.77
CUM % FAIL 0.00 6.67 30.77
TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -34 -61 -112
# INSPECTED 6 15 26
# FAILED 1 8
% (OF INSPECTED) FAILED 0.00 6.67 30.77
INSPECTION CODE KEY
IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure L-2 Summary ofDRY Group tank inspections onboard CVN 71 recordedfrom
Selective Restricted Availability (SRA) periods in 1989, 1991, and 1995.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
DRY GROUP, CVN 72





VOIDS 218 IOH 5
ICO 48
NICO 165




CUM % FAIL 8.77
TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY
COATING AGE (MONTHS) -75
# INSPECTED 57
# FAILED 5
% (OF INSPECTED) FAILED 8.77
INSPECTION CODE KEY
IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure L-3 Summary ofDRY Group tank inspections onboard CVN 72 recorded from
1996 Extended Dry-docking Selective Restricted Availability (EDSRA).
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Bivariate Normal Ellipse P=0.950
Bivariate
Variable Mean Std Dev Correlation
DRY Scale (b) 308.2674 12.6839 0.213438











Figure L-4 Bootstrapped estimates and 95% confidence ellipsefor Weibull parameters
ofShape (a) and Scale (/3) for the DRYgroup. (Thisfigure is a screen capturefrom JMP
version 3.1.6 by SAS Institute Inc.)
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DRY VOID Estimated Survival Function
Estimated Weibull, S(t)
Nonparametric Estimate of S(t)
90% Upper Confidence Limit
90% Lower Confidence Limit
</>
100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
t (months)
Figure L-5 Maximum Likelihoodfit (with 90% confidence bounds) of Weibull
distribution describing the survivalfunction S(t) oftank coatingsfor DRY Group tanks
compared to the nonparametric survival distribution.
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Figure L-6 Maximum Likelihoodfits ofparametric and nonparametric candidate
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Figure L-7 96 month DRY Group Tank Inspection Decision Model. (Thisfigure is a




96 Month Cycle ModelTank Mine. Decision
























































^3 6cp_Mtnc_Cost = $125,300






























































ExpJrftmCost = $0, P = .847
Miss Cost=OFPC
FjcpJ/ltM^Cost = P- 0.153
0.153
Figure L-8 Roll-back ofDRY Group Tank Inspection Decision Model showing expected
costs and recommended action to take during thefirst 96 month period oftank coating
life. (Thisfigure is a screen capturefrom DATA version 2.6.4 by TreAge Software Inc.)
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DRY void Expected Model Costs for Each Decision Option
Over Six 96 Month Periods























96 M onth Period
Figure L-9 Expected Model costsfor various DRY Group tank inspection decision
options over the firstfive 96 month periods oftank coating life.
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APPENDIX M. SPONSON GROUP
This appendix provides a summary of the number of inspections, their times and
the results of those inspections for SPONSON Group tanks on the CVN 69, CVN 71, and
CVN 72. It also provides the plots that support the data analysis in Chapter V and figures
that support the decision analysis of Chapter VI.
TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
SPON VOID GROUP, CVN 69






































IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure M-l Summary ofSPONSON Group tank inspections onboard CVN 69 recorded
from Complex Overhaul (COH) periods in 1986 and 1995. Note that tanks overhauled in
1986 have younger lives than those not yet overhauled in 1995.
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TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
SPONSON VOID GROUP, CVN 71

























IOH = INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
ICO = INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
NICO = NOT INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED
Figure M-2 Summary ofSPONSON Group tank inspections onboard CVN 71 recorded
from Selective Restricted Availability (SRA) periods in 1989, 1991, and 1995.
TANK COATING INSPECTION SUMMARY
SPONSON VOID GROUP, CVN 72
DESIGNATION
SPONSON VOID





TANK COATING FAILURE SUMMARY





= INSPECTED AND OVERHAULED
= INSPECTED AND NOT OVERHAULED





Figure M-3 Summary ofSPONSON Group tank inspections onboard CVN 72 recorded
from 1996 Extended Dry-docking Selective Restricted Availability (EDSRA).
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Variable Mean Std Dev Correlation Signif
.
Prob Number
SPONSON Scale (b) 157.65 29.34 0.37 0001 100
SPONSON Shape (a) 1.8786 0.538
y
V /
Figure M-4 Bootstrapped estimates and 95% confidence ellipse for Weibullparameters
ofShape (a) and Scale (P) for the SPONSON group. (Thisfigure is a screen capture
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Figure M-5 Maximum Likelihoodfit (with 90% confidence bounds) of Weibull
distribution describing the survivalfunction S(t) oftank coatingsfor SPONSON Group
tanks compared to the nonparametric survival distribution.
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Figure M-6 Maximum Likelihoodfits ofparametric and nonparametric candidate
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Figure M- 7 96 month SPONSON Group Tank Inspection Decision Model. (Thisfigure
is a screen capturefrom DATA version 2.6.4 by TreAge Software Inc.)
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SPONSON VOIDS
% Month Cycle Model T ani: Mtnc Decision
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Figure M-8 Roll-back ofSPONSON Group Tank Inspection Decision Model showing
expected costs and recommended action to take during the first 96 month period oftank
coating life. (Thisfigure is a screen capturefrom DATA version 2.6.4 by TreAge
Software Inc.)
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SPONSON Void Expected Model Costs for Each Decision
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Figure M-9 Expected Model costsfor various SPONSON Group tank inspection decision
options over the firstfive 96 month periods oftank coating life.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
"AIRLANT" Commander Naval Air Forces Atlantic Fleet
"AIRPAC" Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific Fleet
"AMSEC" American Systems Engineering Corporation
"ATS" Applied Technical Systems
"CAT EXH VOID" Tanks that provide quench volume for Catapult brakes
"CAT WING VOID" Tanks that provide drainage for Catapult tracks
"CEMAT" Carrier Engineering Maintenance Assist Team
"CLER" Carrier Life Extending Repairs
"COH" Complex Overhaul
"CSMP" Consolidated Ship's Maintenance Plan
"CVN " Aircraft Carrier Nuclear Powered
"DRY" Tanks not normally utilized for liquid storage
"EDSRA" Extended Dry-docking Selected Restricted Availability
"HM&E" Housekeeping and Maintenance Engineering
"IMA" Intermediate Maintenance Activity
"JP-SERV" Tanks characterized as Service tanks for JP-5 Fuel
"J(TRANS)" Tanks characterized as Transient Storage for JP-5 Fuel
"J(FULL)" Tanks characterized as Static Storage for JP-5 Fuel
"LAN" Local Area Network
"LUBE OIL" Tanks characterized as Bulk Lubricating Oil Storage
"MRC" Maintenance Requirements Cards
"PERA(CV)" Planning and Engineering for Repairs and Alterations for
Aircraft Carriers
"PMS" Preventive Maintenance System
"PO" Petty Officer
"SEA WTR (FREQ)" Tanks Frequently exposed to Sea Water
"SEA WTR (INF)" Tanks Infrequently exposed to Sea Water
"SPONSON" Tanks formed by fairing of the ships outer hull surface
149
'SRA" Selected Restricted Availability
TLI" Tank Level Indicator
T&VDB" Data Base of Tank and Void inspection records
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